This paper sets out a new analytical framework for optimal asset allocation of sovereign wealth, based on the theory of contingent claim analysis (CCA) applied to the sovereign's economic balance sheet. A country solves an asset-liability management (ALM) problem between its sources of income and its expenditures. We derive analytically the optimal asset allocation of sovereign wealth, taking explicit account of all sources of risks affecting the sovereign's balance sheet. The optimal composition of sovereign wealth should involve a performance-seeking portfolio and three hedging demand terms for the variability of the fiscal surplus, and external and domestic debt. Our results provide guidance for sovereign wealth management, particularly with respect to sovereign wealth funds and foreign exchange reserves. A real-life application of our model in the case of Chile shows that at least 60% of the Chilean asset allocation should be dedicated to emerging bonds, developed and emerging equities. Chile's current sovereign investment is under-diversified. 
Introduction
The subprime mortgage crisis and its economic impact prompted governments to significantly expand both their balance sheets and their risk exposure. The issue of how countries manage their resources and wealth has recently come under the spotlight.
Increasingly, public institutions other than budgetary government are engaging in largescale financial transactions. Over the past twenty years, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have been set up to manage tax revenues from natural resources (Norway, Chile, Middle East, etc.) and exports (China, Singapore, etc.) , and to transform them into a lasting source of national income. Since the subprime crisis, central banks have considerably expanded both their role and their balance sheets. Lastly, public pension funds have also been created in many countries, often as a result of an excess of contributions over benefits during a demographic transition. The fact that some developed countries suddenly found themselves on the brink of default led to growing awareness of the importance of sovereign risks and created the need for satisfactory monitoring tools.
The sovereign wealth management literature typically views each SWF as an independent entity, with central bank reserves and SWFs being considered separately. On one hand, Scherer (2009a Scherer ( , 2009b , Brown et al. (2010) , Martellini and Milhau (2010) have addressed the optimal allocation for an SWF by examining a "shadow" oil asset or exogenous liabilities of the fund, proxied by an inflation-linked benchmark. On the other, Bernardell et al. (2004) and Beck and Rahbari (2008) determine the optimal allocation of central banks' foreign exchange reserves with the dual objective of avoiding domestic currency appreciation and building up a cushion against a liquidity crisis. But segregating the various items on government balance sheet according to the institutions that manage them is a delusion. This is because, when serious problems arise, all sovereign liabilities are taken into account, including debt and contingent liabilities (e.g. guarantees to the private sector), and all assets become fungible. The example of the recent crisis clearly shows that when a government is short of liquidity to meet its debt repayments, the SWF's or the state pension fund's assets are automatically available to substitute for the funds initially earmarked for this purpose. In 2010, Russia, Ireland, Kazakhstan and Qatar used SWFs or public pension fund assets to invest in banks or shore up equity markets.
In this paper we revisit the issue of sovereign wealth management, considering all sources of sovereign wealth and expenditures, including all public institutions, such as budgetary government, the central bank, SWFs, pension funds and any other public entities under the sovereign's authority. In essence, managing a sovereign seems little different to managing an individual's assets. Each is endowed with capital (human, financial and/or natural resource-related) and has to meet expenditure needs that vary over time and are linked to economic objectives. A sovereign may manage its income and save wisely, using appropriate vehicles so that it can meet its spending requirements (on education, ageing populations, etc.) and cope with the risk of financial crises and the like.
It has to manage the mismatch between its revenue sources and its expenditure, thus solving a classic asset-liability management (ALM) problem. Financial tools developed to manage personal wealth (Merton (1969) , Bodie et al. (1992) , Bodie et al. (2008) ), or pension funds (Hoevenaars et al. (2008) , Bodie et al. (2009) , Bagliano et al. (2009) ) are well suited to this task. But they are only starting to be used to manage sovereign risks. Gray et al. (2007) and Gray and Malone (2008) laid the groundwork in this area by adapting contingent claim analysis (CCA) to sovereign balance sheets with the objective of measuring sovereign credit risk. Financial management of government resources and expenditures raises difficult questions, in which economic policy and financial management objectives are closely entwined.
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This paper proposes an analytical framework for the optimal management of sovereign wealth, based on the analysis of the sovereign balance sheet. Its contribution is to extend the theory and practice of modern CCA to sovereign wealth and risk management. The sovereign balance sheet is not analyzed solely to evaluate sovereign assets and default risk, as in Gray et al. (2007) , but also to measure the risk exposures of the various items composing the sovereign's assets and liabilities. The optimal sovereign asset allocation is derived analytically in an integrated ALM framework, taking explicit account of the items on the sovereign's economic balance sheet. The optimal composition of sovereign wealth should involve a performance-seeking portfolio and three hedging demand terms for the variability of the fiscal surplus, and external and domestic debt.
These results shed new light on the sovereign's optimal allocation of its wealth. Our theoretical results have important practical implications for countries where 1 Standard macroeconomic tools are ill-suited to this task. They lack a significant dimension, namely risk (Gray et al. (2007) ). Most of the macroeconomic variables describe flows. When macroeconomic data on stocks (rather than flows) are available, they are low frequency and cannot be used to evaluate the relevant risks correctly. In the case of sovereign balance sheets, risks are linked to market price fluctuations (for commodities, export goods, wage costs, etc.) that cause the government's income and expenditures to fluctuate, and to inventory changes (natural resource depletion, population growth, etc.). Moreover, in a financial economy, financial risks play a crucial role, with their non-linear features (contingent liabilities modelled as options, etc.), and the accumulation phenomena that lead to systemic risks. Finally, intangible assets and natural capital are never counted. macroeconomic variables are highly volatile but also for countries experiencing strong shocks on their debt. By taking explicit account of all sovereign assets and liabilities, therefore, our framework reconciles previous, separate findings in the literature on management of central bank reserves (Beck and Rahbari (2008) , Caballero and Panageas (2006) ) and SWFs (Martellini and Milhau (2010) , Scherer (2009a Scherer ( , 2009b ),. Finally, we provide a real data application for Chile. We show that the optimal asset allocation is very different to what is currently implemented by Chile in its SWF and the central bank's reserve management department. A substantial portion of the asset allocation should be dedicated to emerging bonds (providing relatively good protection for Chile's liabilities), and to developed and emerging equities.
The Conceptual Framework
As far as we know, the question of efficient management of SWFs, which depends on the state's objective function and structure of the economy, has not been tackled by macroeconomists in a general framework or even a partial equilibrium one.
Resolving this problem would raise difficult questions on the optimal path of sovereign reserve accumulation and the generational distribution of the debt burden, along with the issue of fiscal sustainability and monetary policy efficiency (Aschauer (1985) , Blanchard et al. (1990) , Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) From a purely financial perspective, this can be seen as an ALM exercise. The sovereign has to maximize its expected utility, which is a function of its surplus, measured as the discounted present value of assets minus liabilities as defined in the sovereign's economic balance sheet. This supposes that all sovereign assets and liabilities are estimated at market value. Moreover, changes in financial inflows, outflows and market price movements cause the values of the entity's assets and liabilities to fluctuate.
The risks associated with the various items need to be estimated (Gray et al. (2007) ).
The Sovereign Economic Balance Sheet
The ALM exercise involves estimating the sovereign's global economic balance sheet. Just as a company's balance sheet is regularly used to assess the risk of bankruptcy (Merton (1974 (Merton ( , 1977 , KMV (1999 KMV ( , 2001 KMV ( , 2002 ), so the same analytical framework may be applied to a state. We follow Gray et al. (2007) , Gray and Malone (2008) to estimate the different components of the balance sheet.
The sovereign's assets break down as follows:
( The present value of future income and expense flows can be estimated by discounting all forecasted financial flows, but this would require precise information on the sovereign's expected budget inflows and outflows linked to economic policy decisions (taxation levels, spending targets, implicit liabilities, 4 etc.). An alternative method is to estimate the balance sheet on an integrated basis using market data only (Merton (1974 (Merton ( , 1977 , Gray et al. (2007) ). Table 2 presents this aggregated form. The balance sheet entries have been rearranged in this integrated presentation, subtracting the present value of expenses from the present value of income, and subtracting the value of contingent liabilities from assets. The total value of sovereign assets at any date t is equal to the market value of the claims on these assets: local currency liabilities and foreign liabilities, all expressed in foreign currency. Following Merton (1974 Merton ( , 1977 , the two liabilities can be valued as contingent claims on sovereign assets and can be modeled as options on the total value of the assets. Gray et al. (2007) consider foreign currency debt as a "senior claim" and local currency debt plus base money as a "junior claim". In practice, this hierarchy will depend on governments' objectives and priorities in reimbursing their debt, 5 but historical evidence has shown that many countries prefer to inflate local currency debt instead of defaulting on foreign currency debt. For simplicity, we consider a basic debt structure with two types of debt of zero-coupon form. In what follows, we omit subscript t at t=0. derived from payments promised in foreign currency until time T. The question of identifying the default point is key. Legal enforcement is irrelevant for sovereigns, contrary to corporates. Thus, the decision to default largely depends on the trade-off between the short-run benefits and the longer-run costs of the consequences of a loss of reputation for repayment (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Eaton and Fernandez (1995) ). As stressed by Rogoff (2011) , empirical benchmarks and historical experience usually provide a better guide than theoretical models for forecasting default probability. For example, some countries are used to serial defaults, others are not. Gray et al. (2007) , KMV (1999 KMV ( , 2001 KMV ( , 2002 ) measure medium-term default risk, and set the "distress barrier" as short-term foreign debt plus one-half of long-term foreign debt. Our objective here is different. We are not attempting to estimate the probability of a sovereign's defaulting in the medium run but to measure the best way for it to manage its wealth. As a consequence, liabilities must be considered in their entirety. Total short-and long-term foreign debt must be taken into account.
Following Gray et al. (2007) , we assume that the value of sovereign assets follows a lognormal diffusion process 7 with constant volatility and risk-free rate. Under these assumptions, the value of domestic liabilities can be computed using the Black and Scholes (1973) formula (Merton (1974 (Merton ( , 1977 ):
with N(.) the cumulative standard normal distribution, A µ the sovereign asset's drift and A σ its volatility.
7 Departure from this hypothesis would lead to a more complex estimation of the sovereign assets as the Black-Scholes formula for option pricing would no longer apply but would still be feasible (Christoffersen et al. (2010) ).
The real-world asset drift is related to the foreign interest rate according to the following relationship:
Where λ is the market price of risk reflecting the risk aversion of the investor (here, the sovereign entity). 
Thus, equations (1) and (2) 
Portfolio Choice for Sovereign Wealth
Managing sovereign wealth is not very different from managing the wealth of an individual (Merton (1969) , Bodie et al. (1992) , Bodie et al. (2008) ), a pension fund (Bodie et al. (2009) ) or a foundation (Merton (1993) ). The sovereign receives tax revenues each year. Part of this income can be spent, and the residual can be saved in the SWF, central bank reserves, or public pension fund. How much should be saved and how it should be invested is a classic ALM problem. The optimal allocation and optimal expenditures of the sovereign will crucially depend on the nature and size of its assets and liabilities, and the sources of their uncertainty. A similar problem has been solved analytically in a dynamic case by Merton (1993) for a university endowment fund. The optimal portfolio can be decomposed into speculative demand (the result of the standard mean variance optimal portfolio), and hedging demand components, intended to cover unanticipated changes in assets and liabilities.
In the sovereign case, we consider a static decision process. Applying a dynamic approach would entail defining the macroeconomic dynamics of sovereign balance sheet variables (fiscal surplus, foreign and domestic debt), which would prove very complex and is out of the scope of this paper. We propose to approach the ALM exercise from the perspective of optimizing a surplus (or funding gap), as is traditionally done in the ALM Basically, the sovereign will try to maximize the value of the GSS (target wealth to be left to future generations) for a given amount of risk. In practice, it will choose the most appropriate risk measure for its situation (volatility, probability of a shortfall, expected shortfall, etc.). In what follows, we consider volatility.
The return of the GSS can be written as: β the fraction of total sovereign liabilities dedicated to foreign debt (the remainder is domestic debt). We assume that asset returns, fiscal surplus, foreign and domestic debt have lognormal distributions.
We define their annualized expected returns and second-order moments as:
The expected return and variance of the GSS can be written as: The sovereign chooses the weights assigned to the financial assets. Its optimization problem is:
Differentiating (1) with respect to w, we obtain the first-order condition:
The solution to this asset allocation problem is:
The portfolio has four components: a speculative portfolio ( spec w ) that depends only on expected asset returns and is the solution of the Markowitz (1952) disappears. This is the optimal solution for an investor having only foreign debt. The relative size of the hedging demand terms depends on the relative risk of the fiscal surplus, domestic and foreign debt in the total, but also on the respective size of these elements (α and β ) in the total balance sheet.
These results shed new light on the sovereign's optimal allocation of its wealth.
We see that taking explicit account of all sources of risk affecting the balance sheet of the sovereign, namely its fiscal surplus, foreign and domestic liabilities, leads to a very different optimal portfolio. Previous results on SWFs' asset allocation did not take into account the three sources of risk affecting the sovereign's balance sheet. Martellini and Milhau (2010) express the SWF's preference in real terms and observe a hedging demand against realized inflation. Scherer (2009a Scherer ( , 2009b identifies the optimal asset allocation of a SWF with non-tradable wealth and observe a hedging demand against oil price variations. We show that in a more general framework, three hedging demand terms should be added to the classic speculative portfolio. It is necessary to take into account not only the risks from inflation and fluctuations in natural resources prices (which both influence the variability of the fiscal surplus), but all the risks stemming from the fiscal surplus, and foreign and domestic liabilities. Moreover, fiscal surplus variability is influenced not just by commodity price and inflation volatility, but also by the sovereign's policies on natural resource extraction, taxation, and so on.
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Our theoretical results have important practical implications for countries where macroeconomic variables are highly volatile and introduce considerable uncertainty.
Countries that are natural resource-rich or those exporting manufacturing goods are particularly exposed to fluctuations in commodity or goods prices affecting their revenues. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the level of production or the speed of extraction of natural resources may also add volatility to the sovereign's revenues. These Table A1 in Appendix A, currency composition of ESSF 12 and central bank reserves in Table A2 . Chile is strongly invested in money market instruments (46.3%) and bonds (52.4%). Among them, sovereign nominal bonds account for the largest part, with a small share invested in inflation-linked and corporate bonds. Equities, which have been introduced recently in the PRF, is a very small portion of the total allocation (1.3%).
In terms of currency composition, both ESSF and central bank reserves are mainly invested in US dollars and euro, with a slight part of the portfolio diversified in other currencies (Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, British pound and Japanese yen).
For the sovereign wealth allocation exercise, we allow for a broader investment Based on our analytical framework developed in Section 2, we estimate the sovereign default barrier, the stock of domestic (junior) debt and the sovereign entity's total assets and their volatility. As previously discussed, the distress barrier for foreign currency denominated debt is taken as the whole stock of foreign debt. Resolving the system of equations (1) and (2) enables us to evaluate total sovereign assets in US dollars, as well as their volatility. 16 We use a long time horizon for this analysis, with T= 50 years. 17 Table A3 in Appendix A presents a simplified estimated economic balance sheet for the sovereign entity. The various assets and liabilities are shown, along with their volatilities. 18 The estimated balance of total assets is $64.5 bn, with a volatility of 11.4%.
Subtracting financial wealth (SWFs and central bank reserves) from total assets, the present value of the fiscal surplus is estimated at $20.1 bn.
To estimate the fiscal surplus volatility, we proxy the surplus by the discounted sum of all the sovereign's revenue flows less the discounted sum of all its expenditures.
As discussed in the previous section, we assume 19 that contingent liabilities are negligeable.
Where i R and i E are the revenues and expenditures expected for year i, r is the discount rate, respectively.
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We further assume that receipts are indexed to Chilean inflation, copper prices and equities and that spending is indexed to inflation. 21 This is a reasonable hypothesis as the inflation sensitivity to the annual expenditure growth rate is close to 1 over the period 1991-2009 (see Figure B1 and Table B3 in Appendix B). 22 According to Ffrench-Davis (2010), copper accounts for around 15% of fiscal income, including both taxes and all profits from CODELCO, the state-owned copper company, and taxation of private mining companies. We estimate the sensitivities of the expenditure growth rate to copper, Chile's equity index and inflation over the period 1991-2009 to be respectively 1.05, 0.15 and 0.10. 23 (see Figure B2 and Table B3 in Appendix B). We confirm Ffrench-Davis estimation.
The present value of government expenses is proxied by the price of an inflationlinked bond, of which real coupon is equal to the expenditures (in real terms) that the government expects to make in the future. As for inflation-linked bonds, the nominal coupon paid by the government at a future date i is:
RR the real coupon, and i π the annual inflation rate until year i.
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In the same vein, the present value of fiscal revenues is estimated as a bond, whose real coupon is indexed on inflation, copper and equities. The "nominal coupon" received by the government at year i can thus be written as: ) * * * 1 ( We consider a 50-year bond. This maturity is coherent with the assumed sovereign horizon in the balance sheet estimation. 25 Considering the market quotes of real interest rates (quoted on Chile Inflation Adjusted Notes 20 years maturity, data available since 1994 on Datastream), inflation and copper prices, we estimate the monthly evolution of the present value of the fiscal surplus. Table B4 in Appendix B presents descriptive statistics for each balance sheet variable, as well as the asset classes taken into consideration for the sovereign allocation. Table B5 presents their correlations. Among the possible investments, emerging equities present the most attractive returns (15.41%) over the study period, but also the highest risk (25% volatility, with high extreme risks), followed by emerging bonds (10.33% return, 10.39% volatility). Unsurprisingly, USD short-term bonds are the least risky investment (1.65% volatility) as the balance sheet is expressed here in USD, but they also offer relatively low returns (4.40%) over the period compared to EUR and JPY shortterm bonds (8.69% and 3.76% respectively). Estimated liabilities have an annualized return of 8.08% for external debt and 6.60% for internal debt, with a volatility of 6.64%
and 11.89% respectively. The correlation matrix (Table B5 in Appendix B) offers an interesting picture. Euro short-term bonds and developed equities offer slightly negative 25 The government may have in practice low visibility on its expenditures and revenues in the distant future. Moreover, some of its resources, especially natural ones, may be exhaustible.
correlations with the fiscal surplus (-9% and -7% respectively) . Chile local and external debt have a positive correlation with all markets. External debt has the highest correlation with world inflation-linked bonds (65%), whereas local debt presents the highest correlation with emerging government bonds (57%).
We determine the sovereign's optimal asset allocation (i.e. allocation of its currency reserves and SWF) that (1) minimizes the volatility of the GSS, (2) minimizes the volatility of the GSS for a 5% target rate of return, (3) for a 8.1% target rate of return.
This is the maximum return achievable without shorting 26 certain asset classes. Chart B6
in Appendix B shows the efficient frontier obtained. Table C7 presents the results of three optimal allocations. To achieve the lowest risk, a substantial weight has to be given to equities, more than 34% of the allocation. Among them, 28% should be dedicated to developed markets, 6% to emerging markets. 37% needs to be invested in short-term bonds, especially in EUR (negatively correlated with the fiscal surplus and offering attractive returns over the period), while 27% is allocated to emerging bonds, which are closely linked to Chile's local and external debt and therefore provide relatively good protection for the liabilities. Only 2% should be allocated to inflation-linked bonds. This allows to achieve a 2.83% return of the GSS. When the required return on the surplus is increased to 5%, the proportion allocated to emerging bonds and equities also increases (to 42% and 24% respectively) whereas the portion allocated to developed equities declines (0%). A significant proportion is still allocated to EUR-denominated short-term bonds (31%). Lastly, the maximum return on the surplus is reached with a portfolio allocated 100% in emerging equities. Note that the volatility of the GSS rises from 11.01% to 16.07% due to changes in allocation. This is because 69% of sovereign assets can be exposed to investment and we have excluded short sales and transactions on derivatives, which would have made it possible to modify the overall exposure of the sovereign balance sheet more substantially.
These optimal asset allocations are very different from what is currently implemented by Chile in its SWF and the central bank's reserve management department.
Chile invested mostly in developed countries through short term bonds (bank or sovereign instruments) and long term sovereign bonds. Our results show that a substantial portion of the asset allocation should be dedicated to emerging bonds (providing relatively good protection for Chile's liabilities), and to developed and emerging equities.
Conclusion
This paper proposes an analytical framework for sovereign wealth and risk management, extending the theory of CCA. It derives the optimal sovereign asset allocation in an integrated ALM framework, taking explicitly into account the sovereign economic balance sheet items: fiscal surplus, contingent liabilities, external and domestic debt. Our theoretical results show that the optimal composition of sovereign wealth should involve a performance seeking portfolio and 3 demand terms hedging for fiscal surplus, external and domestic debt variability. Our real data application shows that
Chile's optimal asset allocation should be much more diversified than it is currently, with a substantial part of the asset allocation dedicated to emerging bonds (providing relatively good protection for Chile's liabilities), developed and emerging equities.
A seminal contribution in the field, this work still suffers a couple of limitations. First, we consider a static portfolio choice problem. Introducing a dynamic model for the balance sheet variables (possibly endogeneous as governments have a large influence over their future path) would make it more realistic, but also much more complex. Second, the issue of liabilities having a "default" boundary is also a strong assumption for sovereigns, subject to sovereign immunity. Repudiation, or financial repression (Landon-Lane et
Oosterlinck (2006), Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) ) are options for a sovereign unavailable to an individual and to a corporate. Finally, intangible assets such as human and natural capital should be taken into account. The initiative taken by World Bank (2006) to measure these components of national wealth calls for further development.
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